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Abstract. It is well-known that for several natural decision problems
no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist. This has motivated recent
research on designing variants of feasible Groves mechanisms (termed as
‘redistribution of VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) payments’) that gener-
ate reduced deficit. With this in mind, we study sequential mechanisms
and consider optimal strategies that could reduce the deficit resulting un-
der the simultaneous mechanism. We show that such strategies exist for
the sequential pivotal mechanism of the well-known public project prob-
lem. We also exhibit an optimal strategy with the property that a max-
imal social welfare is generated when each player follows it. Finally, we
show that these strategies can be achieved by an implementation in Nash
equilibrium. All proofs can be found in the full version posted in Comput-
ing Research Repository (CoRR), http://arxiv.org/abs/0810.1383.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Mechanism design is concerned with designing non-cooperative games in which
the participating rational players achieve the desired social outcome by report-
ing their types. Among the most commonly studied mechanisms are the ones
in the Groves family that are based on transfer payments (taxes). For the case
of efficient decision functions they are incentive compatible, i.e., they achieve
truth-telling in dominant strategies. The special case called pivotal mechanism
(sometimes also called VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism) is addition-
ally pay only (i.e., each player needs to pay a tax) and hence feasible (i.e., the
generated deficit is negative or zero).
It is well-known that for several problems incentive compatible mechanisms
cannot achieve budget balance (which states that the generated deficit is zero),
see, e.g., Chapter 23 of [14]. This has motivated recent research in designing
appropriate instances of Groves mechanisms that generate a reduced deficit (or
equivalently higher social welfare). These modifications are termed as ‘redistri-
bution of VCG payments’. In fact, they are variants of feasible Groves mech-
anisms. Notably, [3] and [9] showed that a deficit reduction is possible for the
case of Vickrey auctions concerned with multiple units of a single good. On the
other hand, [1] recently showed that no such deficit reduction is possible in the
well-known case of the pivotal mechanism for the public project problem.
This research direction motivates our study of sequential Groves mecha-
nisms, in particular sequential pivotal mechanism, in which players move sequen-
tially. We face then a new situation since each player knows the types reported
by the previous players. Sequential Groves mechanisms apply to a realistic sit-
uation in which there is no central authority that computes and imposes taxes
and where the players move in a randomly chosen order.
1.2 Contributions
We show here that natural strategies exist in the sequential pivotal mechanism
for the public project problem that generate larger social welfare than truth-
telling. We also exhibit a strategy such that the social welfare is maximized when
each player follows it. Finally, we show that the resulting sequential mechanisms
yield an implementation in Nash equilibrium. Moreover, the vector of the latter
strategies is also Pareto optimal.
To properly describe the nature of the introduced strategies we consider two
concepts. An optimal strategy guarantees a player the maximum utility under
the assumption that he moves simultaneously with the players who follow him.
It also guarantess the player at least the same utility as truth-telling, under the
assumption that the other players are truth-telling. In turn, a socially optimal
strategy yields the maximal social welfare among all optimal strategies.
These concepts allow us to analyze altruistic behaviour of the players in the
framework of sequential pivotal mechanism. By altruistic behaviour we mean
that the players do not only care about their own utility, but also about the
utility of the others.
1.3 Related work
Ever since the seminal paper of [5] mechanism design for public goods has
received a huge attention in the literature. We mention here only some repre-
sentative papers the results of which provide an appropriate background for our
work.
Both the continuous and discrete case of public goods have been studied. The
former situation has been in particular considered in [8], where a taxation scheme
has been proposed which leads to a Pareto optimal solution that can be realized
in a Nash equilibrium. Sequential mechanism design for public good problems
has been considered in [6], where a “Stackelberg” mechanism was proposed that
combines optimal Bayes strategies with dominant strategies.
Here we study the discrete case. The situation when the decision is binary
(whether to realize a public project or not) has been studied in [11], where bal-
anced but not incentive compatible sequential mechanisms have been proposed.
These mechanisms can be realized in an undominated Nash equilibrium and in
subgame perfect equilibrium. Many aspects of incentive compatible mechanisms
for public goods have been surveyed in [4].
The consequences of sequentiality have also been studied in the context of
private contributions to public goods and in voting theory. In particular, [16] has
studied the behavior of players depending on the position in which they have
to take a decision and [7] has explored the relationship between simultaneous
and sequential voting games. More recently, [12] has studied the problem of
determining the winner in elections in which the voting takes place sequentially.
Our focus on maximizing social welfare is related to research on altruistic
behaviour of the player. This subject has been studied in a number of papers
in game theory, most recently in [13], where several references to earlier litera-
ture on this subject can be found. Finally, in a recent work, [2], we carried out
an analogous analysis for two feasible Groves mechanisms used for single item
auctions: the Vickrey auction and the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism.
1.4 Plan of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we recall Groves mech-
anisms and the pivotal mechanism by focusing on decision problems. Then, in
Section 3, we introduce sequential decision problems, in particular sequential
Groves mechanisms.
In the remaining sections we study the sequential pivotal mechanism for
the public project problem. In Section 4 we exhibit an optimal strategy that
in a limited sense simultaneously maximizes players’ final utilities and another
optimal strategy that maximizes the social welfare among all vectors of opti-
mal strategies. Finally, in Section 5, we clarify the status of the optimal strate-
gies introduced in Section 4 by showing that their vector is a Nash equilibrium
w.r.t. appropriately defined preference relations on the strategy vectors, and by
providing a corresponding revelation-type result. We conclude by mentioning
some open problems in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
We briefly recall the family of Groves mechanisms here. In this section we follow
[10]. Let D be a set of decisions, {1, . . ., n} be the set of players with n ≥ 2,
and for each player i let Θi be a set of his types and vi : D × Θi →R be his
(initial) utility function .
A decision rule is a function f : Θ→D, where Θ := Θ1 × · · · ×Θn. It is
called efficient if for all θ ∈ Θ and d′ ∈ D
n∑
i=1
vi(f(θ), θi) ≥
n∑
i=1
vi(d
′, θi).
We call the tuple (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) a decision problem .
Recall that a direct mechanism is obtained by transforming the initial
decision problem (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) as follows:
– the set of decisions is D × Rn,
– the decision rule is a function (f, t) : Θ→D × Rn, where t : Θ→ Rn and
(f, t)(θ) := (f(θ), t(θ)),
– each final utility function for player i is a function ui : D×R
n×Θi → R
defined by ui(d, t1, . . ., tn, θi) := vi(d, θi) + ti.
We call then
∑n
i=1 ui((f, t)(θ), θi) the corresponding social welfare and refer
to t as the tax function .
A direct mechanism with tax function t is called
– (dominant strategy) incentive compatible if for all θ ∈ Θ, i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
and θ′i ∈ Θi
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi),
– budget balanced if
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) = 0 for all θ,
– feasible if
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ,
– pay only if ti(θ) ≤ 0 for all θ and all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}.
Each Groves mechanism is obtained by using the tax function t :=
(t1, . . ., tn), where
1 for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}
ti(θ) :=
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ), θj) + hi(θ−i),
with hi : Θ−i → R an arbitrary function.
Finally, we recall the following crucial result.
Groves Theorem Consider a decision problem with an efficient decision rule
f . Then each Groves mechanism is incentive compatible.
A special case of Groves mechanism is the pivotal mechanism , which is a
pay only mechanism obtained by hi(θ−i) := −maxd∈D
∑
j 6=i vj(d, θj).
Direct mechanisms for a given decision problem can be compared w.r.t. the
social welfare they entail. More precisely, given a decision problem
(D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f)
and direct mechanisms (determined by the sequences of tax functions) t and t′
we say that t′ welfare dominates t if
– for all θ ∈ Θ
n∑
i=1
ui((f, t)(θ), θi) ≤
n∑
i=1
ui((f, t
′)(θ), θi),
– for some θ ∈ Θ
n∑
i=1
ui((f, t)(θ), θi) <
n∑
i=1
ui((f, t
′)(θ), θi).
In this paper we analyze the following well-known decision problem, origi-
nally due to [5], and extensively discussed in the economic literature, see, e.g.
[14,10].
1 Here and below
P
j 6=i is a shorthand for the summation over all j ∈ {1, . . ., n}, j 6= i.
Public project problem
Consider (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f), where
– D = {0, 1} (reflecting whether a project is cancelled or takes place),
– for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, Θi = [0, c], where c > 0,
– for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n}, vi(d, θi) := d(θi −
c
n
),
– f(θ) :=
{
1 if
∑n
i=1 θi ≥ c
0 otherwise
In this setting c is the cost of the project, c
n
is the cost share of the project
for each player, and θi is the value of the project for player i. Note that the
decision rule f is efficient since
∑n
i=1 vi(d, θi) = d(
∑n
i=1 θi − c).
It is well-known that for no n ≥ 2 and c > 0 an incentive compatible direct
mechanism for the public project problem exists that is budget balanced, see,
e.g. [14, page 861-862]. It is then natural to search for incentive compatible
direct mechanisms that generate a smaller deficit than the one obtained by
the pivotal mechanism. However, the following optimality result concerning the
pivotal mechanism, recently established in [1], dashed hope.
Theorem 1. In the public project problem there exists no feasible incentive
compatible direct mechanism that welfare dominates the pivotal mechanism. ✷
Our aim is to show that when the original setting of the public project
problem is changed to one where all players announce their types sequentially
in a random order, then the deficit can be reduced.
3 Sequential decision problems
In this section we introduce sequential decision problems. For notational sim-
plicity, and without loss of generality, we assume that players sequentially report
their types in the order 1, . . ., n. To capture this type of situations, given a de-
cision problem D := (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f), we assume that successively
stages 1, . . ., n take place, where in stage i player i announces a type θ′i to the
other players. After stage n this yields a joint type θ′ := (θ′1, . . ., θ
′
n). Then each
player takes the decision d := f(θ′).
We call the resulting situation a sequential decision problem or more
specifically, a sequential version of D. Note that in a sequential decision
problem a central planner may not exist and decisions may be taken by the
players themselves. Each player i knows the types announced by players 1, . . ., i−
1, so that he can use this information to decide which type to announce. To
properly describe this situation we need to specify what is a strategy in this
setting. A strategy of player i in the sequential version of D is a function
si : Θ1 × . . .×Θi →Θi.
In this context truth-telling , as a strategy, is represented by the projection
function pii(·), defined by pii(θ1, . . ., θi) := θi.
From now on, we consider a direct mechanism
D := (D × Rn, Θ1, . . ., Θn, u1, . . ., un, (f, t))
and mainly focus on Groves mechanisms.
We assume that in the considered sequential decision problem each player
uses a strategy si(·) to select the type he will announce. We say that strategy
si(·) of player i is optimal in the sequential version of D if for all θ ∈ Θ and
θ′i ∈ Θi
ui((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi).
Call a strategy of player j memoryless if it does not depend on the types of
players 1, . . ., j − 1. Then a strategy si(·) of player i is optimal if for all θ ∈ Θ it
yields a best response to all joint strategies of players j 6= i under the assumption
that players i + 1, . . ., n use memoryless strategies or move jointly with player
i. In particular, an optimal strategy is a best response to the truth-telling by
players j 6= i.
A particular case of sequential decision problems are sequential Groves mech-
anisms. The following direct consequence of Groves Theorem provides us with
a simple method of determining whether a strategy is optimal in such a mecha-
nism.
Lemma 1. Let (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) be a decision problem with efficient
decision rule f . Suppose that si(·) is a strategy for player i such that for all θ ∈ Θ,
f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i). Then si(·) is optimal in each sequential Groves
mechanism (D × Rn, Θ1, . . ., Θn, u1, . . ., un, (f, t)). ✷
In particular, when the decision rule is efficient, the truth-telling strategy
pii(·) is optimal in each sequential Groves mechanism.
We are interested in maximizing the social welfare. This motivates the fol-
lowing notion. We say that strategy si(·) of player i is socially optimal in the
sequential version of D if it is optimal and for all optimal strategies s′i(·) of player
i and all θ ∈ Θ we have
∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) ≥
∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj).
Hence a socially optimal strategy of player i yields the maximal social welfare
among all optimal strategies, under the assumption that players i+ 1, . . ., n use
memoryless strategies or move jointly.
Consider now a sequential version of a given direct mechanism
(D × Rn, Θ1, . . ., Θn, u1, . . ., un, (f, t))
and assume that each player i receives a type θi ∈ Θi and follows a strategy
si(·). The resulting social welfare is then
SW (θ, s(·)) :=
n∑
j=1
uj((f, t)([s(·), θ]), θj),
where s(·) := (s1(·), . . ., sn(·)) and [s(·), θ] is defined inductively by [s(·), θ]1 :=
s1(θ1) and [s(·), θ]i+1 := si+1([s(·), θ]1, . . ., [s(·), θ]i, θi+1).
In general, if player i assumes that he moves jointly with players i+1, . . ., n
he will choose an optimal strategy. And if additionally he wants to maximize the
social welfare, he will choose a socially optimal strategy (if it exists). In the next
section we shall see that for the public project problem a sequence of socially
optimal strategies can be found for which the resulting social welfare is always
maximal. In general, we only have the following limited result.
Lemma 2. Consider a direct mechanism (D×Rn, Θ1, . . ., Θn, u1, . . ., un, (f, t))
and let sn(·) be a socially optimal strategy for player n. Then
SW (θ, (s′−n(·), sn(·))) ≥ SW (θ, s
′(·))
for all θ ∈ Θ and vectors s′(·) of optimal players’ strategies.
Proof. Directly by the definition of a socially optimal strategy. ✷
4 Public project problem
In what follows, we focus on the special case of sequential pivotal mechanisms
for the public project problem. First, the following theorem gives an optimal
strategy for player i that may differ from truth-telling. Part (ii) shows that,
under certain natural conditions, this strategy simultaneously maximizes the
final utility of every other player.
Theorem 2. Let D be a public project problem. Let
si(θ1, . . ., θi) :=


θi if
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i < n,
0 if
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i = n,
c if
∑i
j=1 θj ≥ c
be strategy for player i. Then
(i) si(·) is optimal for player i in the sequential pivotal mechanism,
(ii) for all θ ∈ Θ and θ′i ∈ Θi such that si(θ1, . . ., θi) 6= θi and f(θ
′
i, θ−i) =
f(θi, θ−i) we have for all j 6= i
uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) ≥ uj((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj).
In part (ii) θ−i are the types submitted by players j 6= i and θi is the
type received by player i. So part (ii) states that if strategy si(·) of player i
deviates from truth-telling (si(θ1, . . ., θi) 6= θi) and the players who follow i use
memoryless strategies (so in particular, the types they submit do not depend on
the type submitted by player i), then player i simultaneously maximizes the final
utility of the other players (and hence the social welfare). This happens under
the assumption that player i submits a type that does not alter the decision to
be taken.
player type submitted type tax ui
A 110 110 −10 0
B 80 80 0 −20
C 110 110 −10 0
Table 1. Pivotal mechanism
player type submitted type tax ui
A 110 110 0 10
B 80 80 0 −20
C 110 300 −10 0
Table 2. Sequential pivotal mechanism
When each player follows strategy si(·), always the same decision is taken as
when each player is truthful, independently on the players’ order. Additionally,
by part (ii) of Theorem 2 with θ′i = θi, social welfare weakly increases. The
following example shows that sometimes a strictly larger social welfare can be
achieved.
Example 1. Assume that c = 300 and that there are three players, A, B and C.
Table 1 illustrates the situation in the case of pivotal mechanism. In Table 2 we
assume that the players submit their types in the order A, B, C. Here the social
welfare increases from −20 to −10. ✷
However, as Table 2 shows, budget balance does not need to be achieved.
The following result shows that an order can always be found that yields budget
balancedness.
Theorem 3. Let D be a public project problem with the sequential pivotal mech-
anism. For all c > 0, n ≥ 2 and θ ∈ Θ there exists a permutation of players such
that when each player i follows strategy si(·) of Theorem 2, budget balance is
achieved.
Proof. (Sketch). Recall that in the pivotal mechanism, given the sequence of
types θ, a player i is called pivotal if ti(θ) 6= 0. First we show that not all players
can be pivotal. Then we show that the desired permutation is the one in which
the last player is not pivotal. ✷
For instance, in Example 1 when the order is A, C, B or C, A, B, the decision
is taken with no taxes incurred, i.e., budget balance is then achieved.
In Theorem 2(ii) we seem to be maximizing the social welfare. However, this
is not the case because we assume there that each player submits a type that
does not alter the decision to be taken. In fact, strategy si(·) of Theorem 2 is
not socially optimal.
The following theorem provides a socially optimal strategy that in some
circumstances yields a higher social welfare than the above strategy.
Theorem 4. Let D be a public project problem. Let
si(θ1, . . ., θi) :=


θi if
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i < n,
0 if
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i = n,
0 if
∑i
j=1 θj = c, θi >
c
n
and i = n,
c otherwise
be a strategy for player i. Then
(i) si(·) is socially optimal for player i in the sequential pivotal mechanism,
(ii) for all θ ∈ Θ and vectors s′(·) of optimal players’ strategies,
SW (θ, s(·)) ≥ SW (θ, s′(·)),
where s(·) is the vector of strategies si(·).
The remarkable thing about the above strategy si(·) is that when
∑n
j=1 θj =
c and θn >
c
n
, player n submits type 0, as a result of which the project does not
take place. To illustrate this situation reconsider Example 1. When the players
submit their types sequentially in order A, B, C following the above strategy
si(·), then player C submits 0. The resulting social welfare is 0 as opposed to
−10 which results when all players follow strategy si(·) of Theorem 2 (see Table
2). This also shows that the latter strategy is not socially optimal.
However, in general strategy si(·) of Theorem 4 does not need to ensure
budget balance.
Example 2. Suppose that there are three players, A, B, and C, whose true
types are 60, 70, and 250, respectively, while c remains 300. When the players
submit their types following strategy si(·) of Theorem 4, we get the situation
summarized in Table 3.
player type submitted type tax ui
A 60 60 0 −40
B 70 70 0 −30
C 250 300 −70 80
Table 3. Sequential pivotal mechanism
Here the same decision is taken as when each player is truthful and in both
situations the deficit is −70. ✷
On other other hand, part (ii) shows that when we limit ourselves to optimal
strategies and each player follows the introduced strategy si(·), then a maximal
social welfare results. The restriction to the vectors of optimal strategies is nec-
essary. Indeed, Table 3 of Example 2 shows that when the order is A, B, C and
each player follows the strategy si(·) of Theorem 4, then the resulting social
welfare is 380−300−70 = 10. However, when player B submits 300, then player
C pays no tax and the resulting social welfare is higher, namely 380− 300 = 80.
5 Comments on a Nash implementation
The sequential mechanisms here considered circumvent the limitations of the
customary, simultaneous, Groves mechanisms. This and the fact that we max-
imize social welfare by using strategies that deviate from truth-telling requires
some clarification. First of all, we can explain these sequential mechanisms by
turning them into simultaneous ones as follows.
We assume that each player i receives a type θi ∈ Θi and subsequently
submits a function ri : Θ1 × . . . × Θi−1 →Θi instead of a type θ
′
i ∈ Θi. (In
particular, player 1 submits a type, i.e., r1(·) ∈ Θ1.) The submissions are si-
multaneous. Then the behaviour of player i can be described by a strategy
si : Θ1 × . . . × Θi →Θi which when applied to the received type θi yields the
function si(·, θi) : Θ1 × . . . × Θi−1 →Θi that player i submits. Then θ and
the vector s(·) := (s1(·), . . ., sn(·)) of strategies that the players follow yield
an element [s(·), θ] of Θ, where, recall, [s(·), θ]1 := s1(θ1) and [s(·), θ]i+1 :=
si+1([s(·), θ]1, . . ., [s(·), θ]i, θi+1).
Given a decision problem D := (D,Θ1, . . ., Θn, v1, . . ., vn, f) and two strate-
gies si(·) and s
′
i(·) of player i in the sequential version of D, we write
si(·) ≥d s
′
i(·) iff for all θ ∈ Θ
vi(f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi) ≥ vi(f(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi).
We write si(·) >d s
′
i(·) if additionally one of these inequalities is strict, and we
write si(·) =d s
′
i(·) if all these inequalities are equalities.
Note that si(·) ≥d s
′
i(·) for all strategies s
′
i(·) of player i iff strategy si(·) of
player i is optimal in the sequential version of D.
Next, we define for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} a preference relation i on the vectors
of players’ strategies by writing
s(·) i s
′(·) iff si(·) >d s
′
i(·) or
(si(·) =d s
′
i(·) and
for all θ ∈ Θ, vi(f([s(·), θ]), θi) ≥ vi(f([s
′(·), θ]), θi)).
We now say that a joint strategy s(·) is a Nash equilibrium in the sequen-
tial version of D if for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and all strategies s′i(·) of player i we
have
(si(·), s−i(·)) i (s
′
i(·), s−i(·)).
The following result clarifies the status of the strategies introduced in The-
orems 2 and 4.
Theorem 5. Let D be a public project problem.
(i) Each of the vectors s(·) of strategies defined in Theorems 2 and 4, respec-
tively, is a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding sequential version of the
pivotal mechanism.
(ii) The vector s(·) of Theorem 2 is Pareto optimal in the universe of opti-
mal strategies, in the sense that for all θ ∈ Θ the resulting social welfare
SW (θ, s(·)) is maximal among all vectors of optimal players’ strategies.
This result shows that the improvement in terms of the maximization of the
social welfare over the Groves mechanism is achieved by weakening the imple-
mentation in dominant strategies (see Groves Theorem) to an implementation
in Nash equilibrium (in the universe of optimal strategies).
The above definition of the i relation uses the >d relation to ensure that in
the definition of Nash equilibrium the deviations to non-optimal strategies are
trivially discarded. This ruling out of non-optimal strategies is necessary. Indeed,
when θi >
c
n
, with i < n, and
∑n
j=1 θj < c, then player’s i final utility increases
from 0 to θi −
c
n
when he deviates from any of the two strategies considered in
Theorem 5 to the strategy
si(θ1, . . ., θi) :=
{
0 if θi ≤
c
n
c otherwise.
Recall now that the well-known revelation principle (see, e.g., [15]) states
that every mechanism can be realized as a (simultaneous) direct mechanism in
which truth-telling is the optimal strategy. We now show that using any Nash
equilibrium (s1(·), . . ., sn(·)) of Theorem 5 we can construct a revelation-type
simultaneous mechanism in which the vector (pi1(·), . . ., pin(·)) of the projection
functions forms a Nash equilibrium. (Recall that the pii(·) function corresponds in
the sequential setting to truth-telling by player i.) This mechanism is constructed
using the following preference relations ∗i on the vectors of players’ strategies:
s′(·) ∗i s
′′(·) iff
(s1(·) ◦ s
′
1(·), . . ., sn(·) ◦ s
′
n(·)) i (s1(·) ◦ s
′′
1(·), . . ., sn(·) ◦ s
′′
n(·)),
where strategy si(·) ◦ s
′
i(·) of player i is defined by
(si(·) ◦ s
′
i(·))(θ1, . . ., θi) := si(θ1, . . ., θi−1, s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi)).
Theorem 6. Let D be a public project problem. The vector (pi1(·), . . ., pin(·)) of
projection strategies is a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding sequential version
of the pivotal mechanism, where we use the preference relations ∗1, . . .,
∗
n.
Proof. Note that for all j ∈ {1, . . ., n}, sj(·) ◦ pij(·) = sj(·). Then
(pii(·), pi−i(·)) 
∗
i (s
′
i(·), pi−i(·)) iff (si(·), s−i(·)) i (si(·) ◦ s
′
i(·), s−i(·)),
so the result holds by Theorem 5(i). ✷
6 Concluding remarks
As already mentioned, no budget balanced Groves mechanisms exist for the
public project. We have investigated here to what extent the unavoidable deficit
can be reduced when players move sequentially. By focusing on socially optimal
strategies we have incorporated into our analysis altruistic behaviour of the
players.
The results here established hold for the sequential pivotal mechanism. Some
of them, but not all, can be generalized to sequential Groves mechanisms. More
specifically, the strategies introduced in Theorems 2 and 4 are also optimal in
arbitrary sequential Groves mechanisms. The reason is the following observation.
Note 1. Fix an initial decision problem and consider two Groves mechanisms
(with tax functions) t and t′. A strategy of player i is optimal in the sequential
version of t iff it is optimal in the sequential version of t′.
How to generalize the remaining claims of Theorems 2 and 4 to other se-
quential Groves mechanisms remains an interesting open problem.
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Appendix
We provide here the proofs of Lemma 1 and Theorems 2, 3, 4 and 5.
Proof of Lemma 1.
We have for all θ ∈ Θ and θ′i ∈ Θi
ui((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi)
=
n∑
j=1
vj(f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) + hi(θ−i)
=
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θi, θ−i), θj) + hi(θ−i)
= ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi)
≥ ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi),
where the first equality holds by the definition of Groves mechanisms, the second
equality holds by our assumption, and the inequality follows by Groves Theorem.
✷
Below we frequently use the following observation.
Note 2. Let D be a public project problem with the sequential pivotal mecha-
nism. Then
ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) =
{
min(0, n−1
n
c−
∑
k 6=i θk) if
∑
k 6=i θk + θ
′
i < c
min(0,
∑
k 6=i θk −
n−1
n
c) otherwise
✷
Proof of Theorem 2.
(i) By Lemma 1 it suffices to show that f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i). For
this we consider three cases.
Case 1 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = θi.
Then f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i).
Case 2 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = 0.
By definition of si(·), we have i = n and c >
∑n
j=1 θj ≥ si(θ1, . . ., θi) +∑
i6=j θj and therefore f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i), as both sides equal 0.
Case 3 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = c.
By definition of si(·), we have both
∑n
j=1 θj ≥
∑i
j=1 θj ≥ c and si(θ1, . . ., θi)+∑
i6=j θj ≥ c, so f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i), as both sides equal 1.
(ii) By Note 2 we have for all θ ∈ Θ, j 6= i and θ′i ∈ Θi
tj(θ
′
i, θ−i) =
{
min(0, n−1
n
c− (
∑
k 6=i,j θk + θ
′
i)) if
∑
k 6=i θk + θ
′
i < c
min(0,
∑
k 6=i,j θk + θ
′
i −
n−1
n
c) otherwise
Assume that si(θ1, . . ., θi) 6= θi and f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i). Two cases arise.
Case 1 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = 0.
By definition of si(·) we have
∑n
k=1 θk < c. Then
∑
k 6=i θk+si(θ1, . . ., θi) < c.
Also
∑
k 6=i θk + θ
′
i < c since f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i) = 0. Hence
tj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = min(0,
n− 1
n
c− (
∑
k 6=i,j
θk + 0)) ≥
min(0,
n− 1
n
c− (
∑
k 6=i,j
θk + θ
′
i)) = tj(θ
′
i, θ−i).
Case 2 si(θ1, . . ., θi) = c.
Then
∑
k 6=i θk + si(θ1, . . ., θi) ≥ c. Hence
tj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = min(0,
∑
k 6=i,j
θk + c−
n− 1
n
c) = 0 ≥ tj(θ
′
i, θ−i),
where the last inequality holds since the pivotal mechanism is pay only.
Now, in (i) we showed that f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i) and by assump-
tion f(θ′i, θ−i) = f(θi, θ−i).
Hence by the definition of uj
uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) = vj(f(θi, θ−i), θi) + tj(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i)
and
uj((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj) = vj(f(θi, θ−i), θi) + tj(θ
′
i, θ−i),
which yields the claim. ✷
Proof of Theorem 3.
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1 f(θ) = 1.
Then a player i is pivotal iff
∑
j 6=i vj(1, θj) <
∑
j 6=i vj(0, θj), i.e., iff
∑
j 6=i θj <
n−1
n
c.
This means that not all players can be pivotal, since then we would have
(n− 1)
n∑
k=1
θk =
n∑
i=1
∑
j 6=i
θj < n
n− 1
n
c = (n− 1)c,
which cannot be the case as we have assumed that f(θ) = 1.
Choose then a permutation of the players in which the last player is not
pivotal and suppose that each player i submits type θ′i following the strategy
si(·) of Theorem 2. Then the last player submits θ
′
n := c.
This will make all players non-pivotal for the sequence of types θ′1, . . ., θ
′
n.
Indeed, for i 6= n we have then
∑
j 6=i θ
′
j ≥ c >
n−1
n
c, and for i = n we have
∑
j 6=i θ
′
j ≥
∑
j 6=i θj ≥
n−1
n
c, where the second inequality holds by the definition
of the strategies sj(·) and by the fact that n is not pivotal. Therefore all taxes
become 0.
Case 2 f(θ) = 0.
Here, a player i is pivotal iff
∑
j 6=i θj >
n−1
n
c. By an analogous argument
as in Case 1, not all players can be pivotal. Choose then a permutation of the
players in which the last player is not pivotal and suppose that each player i
submits his type θ′i following the strategy si(·) of Theorem 2. Then the last
player submits θ′n := 0.
This makes all players non-pivotal for the sequence of types θ′1, . . ., θ
′
n. In-
deed, by definition of the strategies sj(·) and the fact that n is not pivotal
we have then
∑
j 6=i θ
′
j ≤
∑
j 6=i θj − θn ≤
∑
j 6=n θj ≤
n−1
n
c for i 6= n, and∑
j 6=n θ
′
j ≤
∑
j 6=n θj ≤
n−1
n
c. Therefore all taxes become 0. ✷
The other proofs rely on the following lemma that clarifies the status of
optimal strategies.
Lemma 3. Let D be a public project problem. and let s′i(·) be an optimal strategy
for player i in the corresponding sequential pivotal mechanism.
(i) Suppose
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i < n. Then s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi) = θi.
(ii) Suppose
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i = n. Then
∑n−1
j=1 θj + s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θn) < c.
(iii) Suppose
∑i
j=1 θj = c and i < n. Then s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi) ≥ θi.
(iv) Suppose
∑i
j=1 θj > c. Then
∑i−1
j=1 θj + s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi) ≥ c.
Proof. Denote s′i(θ1, . . ., θi) by θ
′
i.
(i) We proceed by contradiction. Assume that θ′i 6= θi. We consider two cases.
Case 1 θ′i > θi.
Choose θi+1 ∈ Θi+1, . . ., θn ∈ Θn so that
∑n
j=1 θj < c and
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
′
i ≥ c.
Then f(θ) = 0 and f(θ′i, θ−i) = 1.
Subcase 1
∑
j 6=i θj <
n−1
n
c.
Then ui((f, t)(θ), θi) = ti(θ) = 0. Moreover, ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) = (θi −
c
n
) + ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) = (θi −
c
n
) + (
∑
j 6=i θj −
n−1
n
c) =
∑n
j=1 θj − c < 0.
Subcase 2
∑
j 6=i θj ≥
n−1
n
c.
Then ui((f, t)(θ), θi) = ti(θ) =
n−1
n
c−
∑
j 6=i θj . Moreover,
ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) = (θi −
c
n
) + ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) = θi −
c
n
<
n− 1
n
c−
∑
j 6=i
θj ,
where the last inequality holds since
∑n
j=1 θj − c < 0.
Case 2 θ′i < θi.
Choose θi+1 ∈ Θi+1, . . ., θn ∈ Θn so that
∑n
j=1 θj > c and
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
′
i < c.
Then f(θ) = 1 and f(θ′i, θ−i) = 0.
Subcase 1
∑
j 6=i θj <
n−1
n
c.
Then ui((f, t)(θ), θi) = (θi −
c
n
) + ti(θ) = (θi −
c
n
) + (
∑
j 6=i θj −
n−1
n
c) =∑n
j=1 θj − c > 0. Moreover ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) = ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) = 0.
Subcase 2
∑
j 6=i θj ≥
n−1
n
c.
Then ui((f, t)(θ), θi) = (θi−
c
n
)+ti(θ) = θi−
c
n
. Moreover ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) =
ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) =
n−1
n
c −
∑
j 6=i θj < θi −
c
n
, where the last inequality holds since
c−
∑n
j=1 θj < 0.
In both cases we have showed that ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) < ui((f, t)(θ), θi),
i.e., strategy s′i(·) is not optimal.
(ii) We proceed by contradiction. Assume that
∑n−1
j=1 θj+θ
′
n ≥ c. Then f(θ) = 0
and f(θ′n, θ−n) = 1 and as in Case 1 of (i) we conclude that un((f, t)(θ
′
n, θ−n), θn) <
un((f, t)(θ), θn). Hence strategy s
′
n(·) is not optimal.
(iii) We proceed by contradiction. Assume that θ′i < θi.
Case 1 θi >
c
n
.
Subcase 1 c
n
≤ θ′i.
Choose θi+1 ∈ Θi+1, . . ., θn ∈ Θn so that
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
′
i < c and
∑n
j=1 θj > c.
Then f(θ) = 1 and f(θ′i, θ−i) = 0. Besides,
∑
j 6=i θj <
n−1
n
c since c
n
≤ θ′i.
Hence ui((f, t)(θ), θi) = (θi −
c
n
) + ti(θ) = (θi −
c
n
) + (
∑
j 6=i θj −
n−1
n
c) =∑n
j=1 θj − c > 0. On the other hand ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) = ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) ≤ 0, since
the pivotal mechanism is pay only. Hence strategy s′i(·) is not optimal.
Subcase 2 c
n
> θ′i.
Choose θi+1 ∈ Θi+1, . . ., θn ∈ Θn so that
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
′
i < c and
∑
j 6=i θj >
n−1
n
c. Then f(θ) = 1 and f(θ′i, θ−i) = 0.
Hence ui((f, t)(θ), θi) = (θi −
c
n
) + ti(θ) = θi −
c
n
> 0, while
ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) = ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) ≤ 0,
since the pivotal mechanism is pay only. Therefore strategy s′i(·) is not optimal.
Case 2 θi ≤
c
n
.
Recall that we assumed that θ′i < θi. Choose θi+1 ∈ Θi+1, . . ., θn ∈ Θn so
that
∑n
j=1 θj > c and
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
′
i < c. Then f(θ) = 1 and f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = 0.
Hence ui((f, t)(θ), θi) = θi−
c
n
, while ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) = ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) =
n−1
n
c−∑
j 6=i θj , since by the assumptions
n−1
n
c <
∑
j 6=i θj .
But we have θi−
c
n
> n−1
n
c−
∑
j 6=i θj , so ui((f, t)(θ), θi) > ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i),
i.e., strategy s′i(·) is not optimal.
(iv) We proceed by contradiction. Assume that
∑i−1
j=1 θj + θ
′
i < c. Choose
θi+1 ∈ Θi+1, . . ., θn ∈ Θn so that
∑n
j=1 θj > c and
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
′
i < c. Then
f(θ) = 1 and f(θ′i, θ−i) = 0.
Hence ui((f, t)(θ), θi) = (θi−
c
n
)+ti(θ) and ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) = ti(θ
′
i, θ−i).
By optimality of s′i(·) we have ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ), θi), and hence
ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) ≥ (θi −
c
n
) + ti(θ).
Case 1
∑
j 6=i θj <
n−1
n
c.
Then ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) = 0 and ti(θ) =
∑
j 6=i θj −
n−1
n
c. Hence 0 ≥ (θi −
c
n
) +
(
∑
j 6=i θj −
n−1
n
c), i.e.,
∑n
j=1 θj ≤ c.
Case 2
∑
j 6=i θj ≥
n−1
n
c.
Then ti(θ) = 0 and ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) =
n−1
n
c−
∑
j 6=i θj . Hence
n−1
n
c −
∑
j 6=i θj ≥
θi −
c
n
, i.e.,
∑n
j=1 θj ≤ c, as well.
So in both cases we get a contradiction, since
∑n
j=1 θj > c. ✷
Proof of Theorem 4.
(i) To prove that strategy si(·) of player i is optimal it suffices to show that
n∑
j=1
vj(f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) =
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θi, θ−i), θj) (1)
and reuse the string of inequalities from the proof of Lemma 1.
In view of Theorem 2(i) we only need to consider the situation when∑i
j=1 θj = c, θi >
c
n
, and i = n. But then sn(θ1, . . ., θn) = 0, so f(0, θ−n) = 0,
and hence (1) holds for i = n as both sides are equal 0.
To prove social optimality we also need to prove that for all optimal strategies
s′i(·) of player i and all θ ∈ Θ∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) ≥∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj).
(2)
Take some optimal strategy s′i(·) of player i and some θ ∈ Θ. Denote
s′i(θ1, . . ., θi) by θ
′
i. The proof follows a case analysis that reflects the definition
of strategy si(·).
Case 1
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i < n.
Then by Lemma 3(i) θ′i = θi. Also si(θ1, . . ., θi) = θi and then (2) holds.
Case 2
∑i
j=1 θj < c and i = n.
Then sn(θ1, . . ., θn) = 0 and
n∑
j=1
uj((f, t)(sn(θ1, . . ., θn), θ−n), θj) =
n∑
j=1
tj(0, θ−n).
Also by Lemma 3(ii)
∑n−1
j=1 θj + θ
′
n < c, so f(θ
′
n, θ−n) = 0 and
n∑
j=1
uj((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj) =
n∑
j=1
tj(θ
′
n, θ−n).
Note now that f(0, θ−n) = f(θ
′
n, θ−n) = 0 and hence tn(0, θ−n) = tn(θ
′
n, θ−n),
since by Note 2(ii) either both sides equal 0 or n−1
n
c −
∑
j 6=n θj . Further, also
by Note 2 (ii), for all j 6= n
tj(0, θ−n) = min(0,
n− 1
n
c− (
∑
k 6=j
θk + 0)) ≥
min(0,
n− 1
n
c− (
∑
k 6=j
θk + θ
′
n)) = tj(θ
′
n, θ−n).
Therefore we conclude that tj(0, θ−n) ≥ tj(θ
′
n, θ−n). Hence
∑n
j=1 tj(0, θ−n) ≥∑n
j=1 tj(θ
′
n, θ−n) and consequently (2) holds.
Case 3
∑i
j=1 θj = c, θi >
c
n
and i = n.
Note that for all d ∈ {0, 1} we have
∑n
k=1 vk(d, θj) = 0. Also, the pivotal
mechanism is pay only. Therefore we have
n∑
j=1
uj((f, t)(θ
′
n, θ−n), θj) =
n∑
j=1
vj(f(θ
′
n, θ−n), θj) +
n∑
j=1
tj(θ
′
n, θ−n) ≤ 0.
Further, f(0, θ−n) = 0 and hence tn(0, θ−n) = 0. Also for all j 6= n we have∑
k 6=i,j θk + 0 ≤
∑
k 6=i θk <
n−1
n
c, so tj(0, θ−n) = 0.
Since sn(θ1, . . ., θn) = 0, we have
n∑
j=1
uj((f, t)(sn(θ1, . . ., θn), θ−n), θj) =
n∑
j=1
vj(f(sn(θ1, . . ., θn), θ−n), θj) = 0,
and consequently (2) holds.
Case 4
∑i
j=1 θj = c, θi ≤
c
n
and i = n.
Then f(c, θ−n) = 1 and hence tn(c, θ−n) = 0. Also for all j 6= n we have∑
k 6=i,j θk + c ≥
n−1
n
c, so tj(c, θ−n) = 0. Since sn(θ1, . . ., θn) = c, we have as in
Case 3∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(sn(θ1, . . ., θn), θ−n), θj) = 0 ≥
∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(θ
′
n, θ−n), θj).
Case 5 (
∑i
j=1 θj = c and i < n) or
∑i
j=1 θj > c.
Then si(θ1, . . ., θi) = c. By Lemma 3(iii) and (iv) we have
∑
j 6=i θj + θ
′
i ≥ c.
Hence
∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) =
∑n
j=1 vj(1, θj) +
∑n
j=1 tj(c, θ−i)
and
∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θj) =
∑n
j=1 vj(1, θj) +
∑n
j=1 tj(θ
′
i, θ−i).
Note now that f(c, θ−i) = f(θ
′
i, θ−i) = 1 and hence ti(c, θ−i) = ti(θ
′
i, θ−i),
since by Note 2 (i) either both sides equal 0 or
∑
j 6=i θj −
n−1
n
c. Further, as in
Case 4, for all j 6= i we have tj(c, θ−i) = 0. But the pivotal mechanism is pay only,
so for all j 6= i we have tj(θ
′
i, θ−i) ≤ 0. Hence
∑n
j=1 tj(c, θ−i) ≥
∑n
j=1 tj(θ
′
i, θ−i)
and consequently (2) holds.
(ii) Fix θ ∈ Θ. By (i) and Lemma 2 it suffices to prove that for all vectors
s′−n(·) of optimal strategies for players 1, . . ., n− 1
SW (θ, s(·)) ≥ SW (θ, (s′−n(·), sn(·))),
where s(·) is the vector of strategies si(·) of Theorem 4.
Case 1
∑n−1
j=1 θj < c.
Then by Lemma 3(i) [s(·), θ] = [(s′−n(·), sn(·)), θ], so in this case actually an
equality holds.
Case 2
∑n−1
j=1 θj ≥ c.
Then
∑n
j=1 θj ≥ c, and by the fact that the pivotal mechanism is pay only,
the social welfare SW (θ, s∗(·)) is maximal when the vector of players’ strategies
s∗(·) reduces all taxes to 0. This is the case for s(·) since in this case players
n− 1 and n both submit the type c, as a result of which no player is pivotal. ✷
Proof of Theorem 5.
(i) The proof for both vectors is the same. Take a strategy s′i(·) of player i.
Case 1 s′i(·) is not optimal.
Then si(·) >d s
′
i(·) by the optimality of si(·), so (si(·), s−i(·)) i (s
′
i(·), s−i(·)).
Case 2 s′i(·) is optimal.
Then si(·) =d s
′
i(·), so we need to prove that for all θ ∈ Θ
ui(f([s(·), θ]), θi) ≥ ui(f([s
′(·), θ]), θi),
where s′(·) := (s′i(·), s−i(·)). If i = n, this is a direct consequence of the fact that
sn(·) is optimal. Otherwise fix θ ∈ Θ.
Subcase 1
∑i
j=1 θj < c.
Then by Lemma 3(i) we have [s(·), θ] = [s′(·), θ], so in this case actually
ui(f([s(·), θ]), θi) = ui(f([s
′(·), θ]), θi).
Subcase 2
∑i
j=1 θj ≥ c.
Then, when each player k follows the sk(·) strategy, players i, i + 1, . . ., n
submit the type c, so f([s(·), θ]) = 1 and all taxes are reduced to 0. As a result
ui(f([s(·), θ]), θi) = θi −
c
n
.
Further, by Lemma 3(iii) and (iv) we have f([s′(·), θ]) = 1, so
ui(f([s
′(·), θ]), θi) = θi −
c
n
+ ti([s
′(·), θ]) ≤ ui(f([s(·), θ]), θi),
since the pivotal mechanism is pay only.
(ii) By Theorem 4(ii). ✷
